Rant Alert – The wording of this blog entry may not exactly always be … peaceable.
This is one of those tragedies that just goes so impossibly far beyond epic fail. It’s so bad you just don’t even know where to begin. This gulf oil spill of BP’s is just so out of hand.
Okay, yes, to be fair, it was a freak act of nature that took out the rig Deepwater Horizon. And that really was a tragedy, the loss of life.
And sure, no one could have really seen that coming, right?
Although … you’d have thought maybe they kind of should have been able to have seen it coming. Detection of methane gas? Automated emergency systems to shut things down to prevent massive oil spills?
Well that’s the funny thing…
Now I’m no investigative reporter. I don’t have the resources of, say, the New York Times. Or the United States government. I’m just a blogger, doing this for free in my spare time at that. But this is what I’ve dug up:
First of all, the Deepwater Horizon had been issued 18 citations by the Coast Guard in the last decade for spills and fires. Not a stunning track record at almost two citations a year. Though, sadly, fires are not considered “unusual” for oil rig platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. So perhaps this itself wasn’t the warning that it should have been.
Second, while the wellhead was actually fitted with a blow-out preventer (BOP), which is basically a really big valve to shut off the release of oil in case of emergency, this particular BOP was not fitted with acoustic triggers to automate an emergency shutoff in situations like a rig explosion. Nor was it fitted with a remote control. What it did have was a dead-man’s switch so that if communication with the platform was lost, it would cut off. That was supposed to be enough. Although in other countries, it wouldn’t have been enough to satisfy regulation authorities.
But it gets worse. Third, internal BP documents show that the engineers were concerned in 2009 about the metal casing possibly collapsing under high pressure. But nothing was done.
And fourth, in March of 2010, the rig was experiencing problems such as undersea mudslides, sudden methane gas releases, and at least three occasions of the BOP leaking fluid.
Oh. but it’s even worse than that. Fifth, according to a 60 Minutes report, the blow-out preventer was even damaged in an unreported accident in late March, and BP overruled the drilling operator on key operations.
Sixth, in spite of all of this, the BOP’s last inspection from the Bureau of Shipping? 2005.
All of this resulted in what could be politely called “a situation”. One in which on March 10th, 2010, a BP executive emailed the Minerals Management Service about there being a stuck pipe and a “well control situation” and that BP would have to “plugback the well.” And a draft of a memo in April even warned that the cementing of the casing was unlikely to be successful.
Which takes us to May 25th, 2010, the preliminary findings from BP’s internal investigation, as released by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, indicated several serious warning signs such as gas bubbling into the well, signaling an impending blowout, hours prior to the April 20th explosion that killed 11 people.
And began the dump of what is undoubtedly the worst oil spill in American history. Possibly in world history, though until experts can agree on some numbers, no one can really say that for certain.
So as far as I can see, and I admit, somewhere I may have some of this wrong, a structurally questionable well, on a rig with an average of two incidents each year, with a damaged and leaky blow-out preventer with minimal redundancy systems that other governments wouldn’t have considered sufficient and that hadn’t been inspected in 5 years, was seeing increasing incidents of mudslides and methane gas leaks recently, and even detected dangerous methane leaks and other indications of a serious problem, which hours after detection, on the 20th of April 2010, was not shut down nor evacuated, resulting in the worst oil spill in American history and the loss of 11 lives as the Deepwater Horizon burst into flames from a methane-induced blowout while manned.
And that’s just the background.
Since then, BP initially estimated the leak at about 42,000 gallons (1,000 barrels) a day. But the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimated it at five times that much, 210,000 gallons (5,000 barrels) per day, based on satellite pictures. But that was only the beginning of the spill, and the estimates.
BP tried to stop the oil from leaking by using the “top kill” technique, which involved pumping mud down the well to slow the leak long enough to cement it closed. If you think this sounds in any way familiar, read back up to the drafted memo in April warning that cementing the casing was unlikely to be successful. If BP engineers didn’t have faith in such a procedure in April, why then did BP try unsuccessfully, three times to “top kill” their leaking well?
So of course BP had to move on to option 2: Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) Cap Containment System. Which basically involved robots with diamond-blade saws cutting the riser off of the top of the failed BOP to create a cleanly cut pipe that more robots could fit with a cap.
The procedure didn’t go exactly according to plan when the saw wedged into the cut and seized, forcing the switch to less ideal shearing cutters instead, leaving a “ragged” cut. But the cap was still fitted into place. Collecting 420,000 gallons (10,000 barrels) of oil a day now. And it may improve to as much as 630,000 gallons (15,000 barrels) per day, the largest amount that tanker vessels can actually manage to collect.
So wait, they had robots with frikkin diamond-blade saws and their first option was to go with mud? Three times? When their own engineers had earlier expressed some level of doubt?
Yeah.
Also, those of you at home playing the numbers game might be a little confused, as 420,000 gallons is significantly more than the estimated 210,000 gallon leak size by the NOAA. In fact, it’s ten times the initial BP estimate. Did they really known their own well so badly that they could be off by a factor of ten?
And worse, the cap isn’t 100% successful in stopping the leak. Even with the cap collecting far more oil than was estimated to be leaking, there is even more leaking than that. And until August when a relief well can be finished, the cap cannot be 100% successful because there is too much pressure in pipes too badly damaged. There is no complete seal yet, and there won’t be for months.
Which raises the question then, just how many gallons, exactly, are still leaking? Have already leaked? And what damage will this do to ecosystems?
Current estimates are more in the range of 800,000 gallons (19,000 barrels) of oil leaking into the gulf each day. Of which BP is catching 420,000 gallons of. (And at best with their current cap can only catch as much as 630,000 gallons of.) Leaving, even after the “successful” capping done by BP, presently an estimated 380,000 gallons (9,000 barrels) still spilling into the gulf, which is nine times the initial estimate of the spill made by BP. After their “fix”!
Presently the growing oil slick has reached Alabama and Florida now, joining them in the ranks of the other gulf states of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. And it may not even stop there. If the oil slick gets caught in the Gulf of Mexico’s loop current, it might even head up the Atlantic coast.
But yes, the cap was successful. It doesn’t mean that the leak has been stopped or contained. It just means that the leak is less than it was. Perhaps only by half. And for months yet, until relief wells can be drilled to exhaust the pressure, that’s the best that BP can do. While the oil spill has not only flooded the gulf with crude, but now may very well escape the gulf and move up the Atlantic coast as well.
Congratulations?
I don’t think so.
The only way heads won’t roll in this one is if this is the very spark that triggers the supposed end of the world in 2012.